VANCOUVER
— When Gordon Campbell swept to office in 2001 with
a stunning victory that gave him all but two seats
in the provincial legislature, his Liberal Party had
a clear mandate to remake British Columbia just
about any way it wanted.
And it didn't take the Premier long to start making
big changes, as he announced a 25-per-cent tax cut
on his first day in office, dramatically underlining
his message that B.C. was "open for business."
Privatization of Crown assets and a revitalization
of B.C.'s aging transportation system were both high
on Mr. Campbell's action agenda, and within months
he was thinking about selling BC Rail. But
offloading the iconic, debt-ridden railway owned by
the province since 1918 would prove to be one of the
most troubling deals his government has ever made.
Thousands of pages of partly censored internal
documents were released last week by the Supreme
Court of British Columbia in response to an NDP
motion in a political corruption trial involving
Dave Basi and Bobby Virk, former ministerial aides
charged with fraud, breach of trust and accepting
bribes in relation to the sale of BC Rail. The
documents are shedding new light on how the
government strategized on the controversial
$1-billion deal, which continues to haunt Mr.
Campbell even as he seeks a third term in the May 12
vote.
Within months of taking office, Mr. Campbell was
being advised that a key part of his transportation
plan should be selling BC Rail. "Let the market
drive public policy, for so goes the economy of the
province," states one internal government note that,
like many of them, has the sender's identity blanked
out.
By fall the government had a task force examining
privatization opportunities, and by the following
spring a note urges Mr. Campbell to sell BC Rail
quickly.
"The BCR Group of Companies is a $1-billion dollar
public asset, that is currently losing 10 per cent
per year or more, due to changing times. As a crown
corporation it has peaked, stalled and rolled over
the top onto a downhill slide. ... Now is the time,
to maximize the corporate return from the BCR Group
of Companies, to reduce the deficit!" it states.
The files do not reveal Mr. Campbell's response. But
throughout 2002, he repeated his "New Era" campaign
promise not to sell BC Rail.
In an Aug. 19, 2002, e-mail to a BC Rail employee,
name blanked out, Mr. Campbell couldn't state it
more clearly: "I assure you that the government is
not looking at the privatization of BC Rail as part
of our transportation strategy."
By that fall, however, Mr. Campbell was meeting with
officials from other railways, including Matthew
Rose, president of Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Corp., which would later become a bidder along with
another U.S. company, OmniTRAX.
And while publicly denying BC Rail was for sale, the
government began secretly preparing to announce the
deal. A file marked "confidential" shows that by
November, 2002, the government had a media plan
drafted.
"The communications strategy presented in this
document has been prepared to provide guidance for
planning and implementing an announcement regarding
a decision to sell the industrial freight division
of BC Rail," it says.
It notes the "New Era campaign promise 'not to sell
or privatize BC Rail' " will cause problems, but
tells ministers to focus on the demand of BC Rail
customers for better service, and on the "serious
financial risk to BC taxpayers" posed by the
railway's $639-million debt.
It says supporters should be lined up in advance.
"The key spokesperson(s) will be media trained prior
to the announcement using key messages and master Q
& A document. ... In advance of the announcement a
select group of customers and supporters will be
provided with relevant factual information and
messages to support the sale announcement and
respond to media enquiries," it states.
And the strategy sought to have officials "make
calls to select business media" to help guide
coverage. "The decision to sell would be positioned
in terms of a response to overwhelming evidence
against retaining the freight railway in government
hands," it says.
After issuing a request for proposals for BC Rail's
freight division, in May, 2003, the government
studied bids from CN, CP and a combined offer from
OmniTRAX-Burlington Northern Santa Fe.
The files include minutes that show Mr. Virk, the
ministerial aide who would later be charged with
accepting bribes for allegedly leaking information
in exchange for money and gifts, was involved with
the committee evaluating the bids.
"Virk to work with [deputy minister Chris] Trumpy
and the Office of the Premier to finalize letters of
invitation ...Virk to confirm with [Transportation]
Minister [Judith] Reid the relationship between BC
Rail, the Northern Transportation Strategy discussed
at the fall session. ...Virk to ensure Minister Reid
confirms outcome," state various entries.
On Nov. 25, 2003, the government announced a deal
that gave CN the right to operate on BC Rail's
roadbed under a 60-year lease renewable for up to
990 years.
But behind the scenes it hadn't gone smoothly. CP
and the U.S. bidders complained because CN alone had
been given an opportunity to meet with BC Rail
shippers, gaining valuable knowledge about rates
that other bidders didn't have.
"Our dismay arises because of the lack of fairness
in which the process has been conducted so far, the
apparent favoritism of certain bidders, and the lack
of timely information," Peter Rickershauser,
vice-president of Burlington Northern, wrote on Nov.
18.
CP raised similar concerns a week earlier - and
dropped out of the bidding.
But while the complaints were unsettling to the
government, which insisted it had run a fair
process, far worse was to come.
On Dec. 28, 2003, police raided the legislature and
hauled away files from the offices of Mr. Basi, who
was a ministerial aide to then-finance-minister Gary
Collins, and Mr. Virk, an aide to Ms. Reid.
The government didn't let the raids stop the BC Rail
deal, which closed in July, 2004, but a second
privatization offer, for a BC Rail port subdivision
at Robert's Bank, was cancelled when police told
officials confidential information had been leaked.
The joint case against Mr. Basi and Mr. Virk remains
in pretrial hearings. Many more documents are
expected to emerge at trial.
What's in the files
The information contained in the 8,000 pages of
documents includes:
Heavily edited cabinet minutes where even the
subject headings are blanked out.
Media strategies that call for reporters to be "hand
picked" for inside scoops and the presentation of
groomed "supporters" to validate the government's
message.
A 2003 letter to Martyn Brown, then Premier Gordon
Campbell's chief of staff, that contains a job
application from Bobby Virk, saying he was referred
by Mr. Campbell and Lara Dauphinee, the executive
assistant to the Premier.
An audit that shows op-ed pieces submitted by Mr.
Campbell, and run by many newspapers including The
Globe and Mail, "have been written for the Premier
by IGRS [Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat]."
Heavily redacted correspondence tracking notes from
Mr. Campbell's office that contain heads such as "RCMP
raid on the Legislature" and "Basi/Virk cases rel'd
to BC Rail partnership." Notes indicate material was
blanked out under various sections of the Privacy
Act.
Documents online
The New Democratic Party posted on the Web yesterday
digital copies of thousands of pages of internal
government documents released recently by the
Supreme Court of British Columbia. The NDP got
access to the material by filing a motion for
material that defence lawyers in a political
corruption trial had earlier obtained under the
Freedom of Information Act. The documents are
related to the $1-billion sale of BC Rail by the
government in 2003. "These documents shed some light
on the B.C. Rail corruption scandal, and the public
deserves to have access to this information," NDP
attorney-general critic Leonard Krog said in
releasing the material.
The documents are posted at:
http://www.bcndpcaucus.ca/en/bcrailcorruption
Mark Hume

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